GAZPROMNATION

"We've recently heard more veiled threats from Putin about Ukraine being unable to pay for gas (thus presumably leading to new attempts at cutting them off), which suggests that Russia is getting itself ready to start a new crisis. That means two things:

 

1. the internal infighting between groups of powerful Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs for the control of unofficial Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine (more on this below) is still not conclusively settled, and requires "action" using official levers of State and interference with Gazprom's export deliveries through Ukraine;

 

2. Russia thinks it stands a better chance to focus European blame on Ukraine and, even more importantly, to get Europeans to buy off the Ukrainians (thereby increasing the available unofficial gas loot for the players involved).

 

While Russia's actions are not easily understandable when considered as those of a country, they are much easier to interpret rationally when you look at who the actual players behind the scenes are. Conversely, public European reactions which sound logical are, in fact, incredibly naive if you know the industry a bit and, given that the people involved are certainly not naive, they are other things at stake.

So let's try to make some predictions and unravel what's actually going on.

Originally posted on European Tribune. See also my full series of articles on earlier episodes of the Russian-Ukrainian crises here

First, as a reminder, since 1994, there have been two separate bits in the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade:

 

• the official part, whereby Gazprom delivers gas to Naftogaz (roughly 20-25bcm/y), the Ukrainian national gas company, and uses Naftogaz's network of pipelines for its gas exports to Europe (including Turkey) - roughly 130-150bcm/y of transit; this trade roughly balances itself out, ie is settled without any ash payments. Given that gas prices are more volatile than transit prices, Gazprom regularly tries to get paid something more for the gas it delivers, arguing that it has become worth more than the transit services, and Ukraine refuses to (or can't) pay. This is the public dispute, and it is, in reality, a sideshow;

 

• the unofficial part, whereby semi-mysterious traders like RosUkrEnergo and its predecessors deliver gas to Ukrainian clients using Gazprom's pipelines but gas formally sourced elsewhere. As I have explained in detail in this paper for the IFRI research institute, this business was created by Gazprom managers, jointly with large Ukrainian gas consumers, to get around the impossibility for Gazprom to get paid by Naftogaz under the official trade: Ukrainian gas users get gas cheaper than if they bought if from Naftogas, and the suppliers get some money from gas deliveries from Gazprom's network to Ukraine; the initial customers can then on-sell more gas to other Ukrainian users and make additional money for them and their Russian accomplices. This is fundamentally an unstable business because (i) it has to be done in the shadows, as it goes directly against the interests of Naftogas, the national company, and it uses Gazprom's network at no benefit for the company, (ii) all the major Ukrainian gas users (mainly the big steel-bashing companies in the East) want to be the privileged intermediary that gets first access to the gas and a cut on further sales, (iii) various clans within Gazprom (and their associates in the Kremlin) want their hands on that juicy business. Amongst unavoidable players in this game, you thus have the big customers in Ukraine, the people with formal authority over gas transit both in Ukraine and in Russia, the people with access to gas inside Russia or in Central Asia, and their counterparts within Gazprom...

 

Fights on the second front can spill on the first front, as the two businesses largely use the same pipelines and gas inside the system is fully fungible.

The West's error has been to try to interpret what's going on in light purely of the first, public, conflict. Of course, one reason this happened was that in 2006, some players in the West had very strong motivations to suddenly make a big deal of what had been a recurring, and mostly ignored, conflict. The UK government was facing the very real prospects of gas cuts as domestic production was shrinking and inadequate plans for import and gas storage were in place; the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis offered a perfect opportunity to turn a domestic policy failure into an international conflict, with blame nicely thrown at a familiar enemy. In parallel, the US administration had cooled on Putin following the takeover of the Russian oil industry by oligarchs unfriendly to the Western majors which he oversaw; that crisis was a perfect opportunity to paint him as a dictator bent on oppressing his neighbors, especially in the wake of the "colour" revolutions in Ukraine or Georgia. Once that interpretation was pushed unto an unsuspecting public, it took hold - and the Russians, focused on the behind-the-scenes conflict, did little to behave in ways that could have changed that perceptions.

That interpretation of the conflict also had the added benefit of make the US and UK look like the defenders of freedom and markets in Europe, against the weak and compromising French, German and Italians, too cowardly or corrupt to confront the Russians, and too busy coddling their national energy companies against from the "fair competition" of more nimble markets which would otherwise spontaneously create alternatives to Russian gas imports.

By 2009, it was obvious that things were not completely black and white, and the narrative of Russia imperialistically exercising the "energy weapon" against the plucky freedom-loving Ukrainians and other neighbors was not enough to explain things. Europeans, collectively, started taking a harder look at Ukraine's behavior - but they continued to focus almost exclusively on the first conflict, which was much easier to grasp. Russia decided to push its advantage, to push the blame on official Ukraine, and hopefully get Europe to finally pay them something for the gas delivered to Ukraine - thus the much longer cuts that took place in January, and what appeared to be a successful resolution through European loans to Ukraine. But of course, as I predicted then, Ukraine failed to meet the conditions to get that loan (which, contrary to the loans extracted from Russia, they'd actually have to repay), dumping the problem once again in Russia's lap.

Fundamentally, even with the new pipelines Russia is building, Ukraine has a stranglehold over Russia's exports, and can go on not paying for its official gas deliveries, effectively offsetting these with the transit service; and it should be noted that, even with variable prices for natural gas, this is not a bad deal for Gazprom (which know it). So while there is a lot of theater around the first conflict, and continued attempts to change the stable solution that has been reached, this is not an equilibrium likely to change, unless Russians and Ukrainians (which have a common interest there) somehow manage to make the European cough up some money along the way. Thus the continues crises, and the fearmongering about Russia's "energy weapon," which is basically encouraged by Russia to some extent as it seems to give them a bit more leverage and importance in the public eye.

The second conflict is much more intractable, much less subject to the restrictions of traditional diplomacy, and its players are likely to continue to use and abuse the instruments of State they control for their private purposes, thereby creating confusion for international onlookers.

So it is likely that further crises will erupt, and that gas deliveries to Europe will be temporarily shut down, typically in January.

Before going into predictions, an aside: gas consumption is very seasonal, with winter consumption typically double or triple summer levels, which means that quite a bit of storage capacity is needed to smooth out deliveries and ensure adequate supplies through the winter (deliveries in winter are often lower than demand). Most consumer countries - and in particular big importing countries - have significant buffers, and these are usually full at the beginning of the winter, ie when the crises happen. So, other than for a very small number of East European countries that have little storage and fully depend on Russian deliveries, Russian gas cuts have no impact whatsoever on actual gas availability for consumers in most countries, which can simply draw on their stored reserves a bit more than usual.

As a final point of background, and as I have argued many times before, electricity market deregulation in Europe has encouraged investment by players in gas-fired power plants, because they are the easiest and least risky to finance (given that electricity prices are largely driven by gas prices, as gas-fired plants are the marginal cost suppliers most of the time, gas-fired plants are almost always going to be in the market, or near enough, to be viable, as opposed to plants with high fixed costs like nuclear or wind which, unless they benefit from specific regulation, can find themselves making short term losses for longer than investors can afford, even if their long term average price is competitive). Over the past 10 years, Europe has built only two kinds of power plants: wind farms, thanks to the specific renewable energy rules, and gas-fired plants:

So, if one is worried about the gas supplies from Russia, there are two very simple steps fully under our control:

 

• change power market regulation to eliminate its proven bias towards gas-fired power plants and limit the growth of European demand for gas, a large portion of which, in the long run, can only be supplied by Russia; pointing a finger at Russia's supposed "energy weapon" when one could very easily be less dependent on gas is a sign of incompetence or a distraction from the other priorities of such energy policies (which are, in fact, a jobs programme for City commodity traders, M&A advisors and associated parasites);

 

• for countries that do not have sufficient gas storage capacity, urgently work on building these, or getting permanent access to friendly neighboring countries that may have more favorable locations available; lack of storage capacity may have been a valid excuse 15 years ago for many former Soviet Bloc countries which had built infrastructure predicated on Soviet deliveries, but today it should not wash - and blaming Russia for gas delivery cuts is, again, a distraction from incompetent domestic policies.

 

So, finally, my predictions:

 

• there will be another gas crisis this winter as Russia senses European worries and tries to get the EU to send some money in Ukraine's way, for Russia's benefit;

 

• Europe will, once again, ignore the real issue (that Ukraine and Russia have willfully created a parallel gas market, and that their politicians are more busy trying to grab a slice of the loot than to enact sensible energy policies, and will repeat the same tired angry platitudes about the need for Russia (and possibly Ukraine) to behave, and for Europe to be "unified" against this threat (the separate negotiations run by GdF, E.On and Snam will be called inefficient, when they are nothing but; the fact that all of Russia's pipelines go to Europe and they have no choice where to sell their gas will be under-emphasised; the very real protection brought by long term take-or-pay will be ignored - or even undermined)

 

• there will be yet more calls for a better European gas market, for further energy deregulation (ignoring that this encourages gas consumption), and for a joint purchasing authority (see here for a recent exemple from a French politician who should know better), without any discussion of how that gas should be split, who should get the presumed (but imaginary, given that current price formulas are already market based) cost savings wrung out of Russia, and who will decide on allocation of shortages, if any;

 

• expect shortages to appear again in selected East European countries (ie , in some cases, to be manufactured by local authorities in order to blame Russia), without any discussion of the reality of storage and the lack thereof, and conversely, dark accusations (augmented by London and Washington) about the insufficient lack of solidarity of Western Europe and its cowardice towards Russia, with associated calls for further European subsidies to build new connecting infrastructure (a not completely unreasonable idea) or new nuclear or coal-fired power plants;

 

• Russia will play its accustomed role with its usual rigidity, alternating dark threats, accusations of unfairness from Europe, and shameless calls for Europe to pony up money; it will certainly not offer to sell its gas at Ukraine's border, which would dump the transit problem in Europe's hands, but eliminate the possibility of the second market to exist (Europe will not try to offer the same, as nobody is keen to take over Ukraine's gas infrastructure and its associated problems (underinvestment, corrupt managers at all levels, and a legacy of complex contracts to untangle));

 

• Ukraine will be, as usual, completely confused, given that the 3 political forces that are fighting it out in Kiev de facto represent 3 of the oligarchic clans that are fighting for the loot. They WILL cut off Europe if Russia reduces deliveries, but otherwise, beyond expecting to get money from the outside, will do nothing to solve the issue or clarify it;

 

• in the end, the crisis will come and go with no actual impact on the ground (other than temporary or manufactured ones in select countries), politicians and pundits will huff and puff and pontificate importantly, and will provide no actual solution, because none is needed for the important things (Europe does get all the Russian gas it wants), and none is available for the real loot-capture underneath, which is only to the detriment of Russian and Ukrainian citizens, but who cares about them?

(THE OIL DRUM)

"Es war von Anfang an umstritten, das himmelstürmende Vorhaben. Doch jetzt wird der vom Volksmund spöttisch "Kukuruz" (Mais) genannte Wolkenkratzer ernsthaft in Frage gestellt. Eigentlich will sich der mächtige Gazprom-Konzern in St. Petersburg ein Denkmal setzen - mit einem von Londoner Architekten entworfenen Büroturm, der die in der Stadt festgelegte Höhengrenze von 48 Metern gleich um 348 Meter überschreitet. Der halbstaatliche Gasmonopolist hat auch gerade die Genehmigung der Behörden erhalten. Doch plötzlich regt sich Widerstand auf höherer Ebene. Gut möglich, dass verfeindete Spitzenbeamte mit dem "Kukuruz" einen Stellvertreterkrieg führen. Aber dass im Staatsfernsehen ein Projekt des schier allmächtigen Gaskonzerns als zwielichtig vorgeführt wird - das hätte es noch vor einem Jahr nicht gegeben.

Wer den Schaden hat, braucht für den Spott nicht zu sorgen. Dabei nimmt sich die vorsichtige Belustigung über den "Kukuruz" im Vergleich zum Schaden durch die Wirtschaftskrise lächerlich aus. Sie nämlich lässt nicht nur den Wolkenkratzer auf dem Reißbrett wanken, sie stellt die Statik der gesamten Geschäftsarchitektur des Konzerns auf den Prüfstand. Nach mehr als sieben fetten Jahren, in denen Gazprom wegen der hohen Rohstoffpreise und der stets steigenden Nachfrage vor Kraft kaum noch gehen konnte, fällt der Rückschlag heftig aus. Gerade einmal 240,1 Milliarden Kubikmeter Gas wurden im ersten Halbjahr verkauft, das sind 69 Milliarden Kubikmeter - sprich: zwei Drittel des deutschen Jahresverbrauchs - weniger als im Vergleichszeitraum des vergangenen Jahres. Am meisten schmerzt die Gazprom-Manager, dass das Westeuropa-Geschäft um mehr als 23 Prozent abgenommen hat. Gerade dort nämlich, wohin Gazprom nur ein Drittel seines Gases exportiert, verdient der weltgrößte Gaskonzern zwei Drittel seines Geldes. Die mangelnde Nachfrage in Kombination mit dem gesteigerten Angebot auf dem Weltmarkt lasse nicht nur die Preise fallen, stellt die Internationale Energieagentur fest. Sie führe auch dazu, dass Russlands Einfluss auf die europäischen Kunden schwinde. In der Tat musste Gazprom mehr Verluste erleiden als seine Konkurrenten. Insgesamt ging die Nachfrage in Europa nur um gut zehn Prozent zurück. Auf diesem Niveau werde auch Gazprom zum Jahresende sein, sagt der Vizechef der Konzerntochter "Gazprom Export", Sergej Tschelpanow, zuversichtlich.

Doch es ist offenkundig, dass dem Unternehmen Kunden abhanden kommen. "Die Käufer versuchen, den Anteil anderer Lieferanten sowie alternativer Energie zu erhöhen", sagt Vitali Krjukov, Analyst des Investmentfonds "IFD Capital". Und das hat nur zum Teil mit dem Wunsch zu tun, die Abhängigkeit vom russischen Koloss mit seinen 400 000 Mitarbeitern zu verringern. Der Hauptgrund liegt im Preis und in der Art, wie dieser gebildet wird. Gazprom hat ähnlich wie sein Hauptkonkurrent Norwegen langfristige Verträge mit seinen Kunden. Weil der Gaspreis gemäß diesen Verträgen den seit Herbst 2008 fallenden Ölpreisen erst mit einer Verspätung von sechs bis neun Monaten folgt, haben die Käufer sich bis zum Sommer mehr und billiger auf den Spotmärkten mit ihrem kurzfristig erhältlichen Angebot bedient.

Die Norweger erkannten den Trend schneller als die Russen, reagierten flexibler und gewannen daher auch Marktanteile hinzu. Gazprom hingegen blieb gänzlich beim alten Schema. Und verlangt nun sogar, dass seine europäischen Großkunden Strafe zahlen, weil sie die vertraglich vereinbarte Mindestabnahmemenge (Klausel "Take-or-pay") unterschreiten. Unterschiedlichen Berechnungen zufolge geht es um zwei bis 2,5 Milliarden Dollar - mit dem kuriosen Nebeneffekt, dass Gazprom nach Berechnungen der Zeitung "Wedomosti" auch noch 600 Millionen Dollar (400 Millionen Euro) Exportzölle spart, weil es für ein Gas kassiert, das das Land gar nicht verlassen hat. Dass sich der weltweit größte Gasexporteur, an dessen Tropf der russische Staatshaushalt hängt, auf der jüngsten Weltgaskonferenz in Buenos Aires der Tatsache eines Überangebots auf dem Markt verschließt, passt nicht zur eigenen Erfahrung. Schon vor einem halben Jahr nämlich haben die Russen die Abnahme turkmenischen Gases, das über Russland in den Westen weiterverkauft werden sollte, eingestellt - weil sie nicht mehr wussten, wohin damit. "Entweder wir korrigieren den Preis oder die Menge", sagte Gazprom-Vizechef Valeri Golubev damals forsch.

Was Gazprom von den Turkmenen forderte, wollen die europäischen Abnehmer von Gazprom. Die Verhandlungen gestalteten sich schwierig, sagte E.on-Chef Wulf Bernotat. Und wies darauf hin, dass E.on mit anderen Lieferanten sehr wohl übereingekommen sei, jetzt die Einkaufsmenge zurückzufahren und die Differenz später zu beziehen. "Gazprom müssen wir erst überzeugen." Die Europäer hätten keine schlechte Verhandlungsposition, sagt Michail Kortschemkin, Direktor von East European Gas Analysis: Schließlich hätten sie Gazprom auch keine Strafe aufgebrummt, als der Konzern zu Jahresbeginn aufgrund des Konflikts mit der Ukraine seinen Lieferverpflichtungen nicht nachgekommen sei. Nun habe sich das Blatt eben gewendet. Zumindest für die Phase der niedrigen Gaspreise bis Mitte 2010 müsse Gazprom "unbedingt auf einen Teil seiner Exporterlöse verzichten." Sonst verliere der Konzern sie womöglich ganz.

Im Moment ist es vor allem der Preis, der Gazprom zu schaffen macht. Üppige 450 Dollar je 1000 Kubikmeter Gas hatte Europa im Vorjahr den Russen bezahlt, gegenwärtig ist es nur noch die Hälfte. Die Koppelung an den Ölpreis, der zu Beginn des Jahres auf ein Tief von 45-55 Dollar je Barrel gesunken war, schlägt nun voll durch. Grund genug für Kunden, nach einem halbjährigen Abwarten seit Sommer doch wieder vermehrt einzukaufen. Dies wird freilich wenig daran ändern, dass der Konzern im laufenden Jahr nur 40 Milliarden Dollar in Europa einnehmen wird, während es im Vorjahr 65 Milliarden Dollar waren. Die Einnahmen im Inland, wo der staatlich verordnete Niedrigpreis im dritten Quartal gerade einmal 45 Dollar je 1000 Kubikmeter betrug und erst in den nächsten Jahren auf europäisches Niveau steigen wird, können die Verluste nicht wettmachen. In den ersten neun Monaten hat Gazprom 7,08 Mrd. Euro Gewinn erzielt, nur halb so viel wie 2008.

Bleibt nur zu sparen - etwas, wozu Gazprom in den vergangenen Jahren nicht gezwungen war, weshalb die Nettoschulden Ende Juni auf umgerechnet 31 Milliarden Euro kletterten. Weil Gazprom für das kommende Jahr nur mit einem Verkaufspreis von 300 Dollar je 1000 Kubikmeter Gas in Europa rechnet, sollen die Investitionen nur um 5,4 Prozent auf 18,7 Milliarden Euro steigen, wovon nur ein Sechstel in langfristige Maßnahmen wie Zukäufe von Lagerstätten fließt. Obwohl die Förderung in diesem Jahr bereits auf einen historischen Tiefstand gesunken ist, müssen nun auch Großprojekte wie die Erschließung des riesigen Stockman-Feldes in der Barentssee aufgeschoben werden.

In Europa werde die Nachfrage ohnehin erst 2020 wieder das Vorjahresniveau erreichen, heißt es von der Energieagentur. Gazprom selbst ist da optimistischer. Außerdem lockt China, mit dem Gazprom soeben ein Rahmenabkommen geschlossen hat. Der Konzern will dorthin künftig zumindest halb so viel exportieren wie nach Europa. Aber noch fehlen die Lieferwege, und China drückt den Preis. Gazprom gibt sich optimistisch. Und hat dafür auch durchaus Gründe. Soeben haben die skandinavischen Staaten ihre Zustimmung für den lange blockierten Bau der Pipeline Nordstream durch die Ostsee nach Deutschland gegeben. Damit wächst die Unabhängigkeit vom schwierigen Gas-Transitland Ukraine. Und im Süden schloss sich soeben mit Slowenien ein weiterer Staat dem russischen Pipelineprojekt South-Stream an. Möglicherweise wird auch der "Kukuruz" doch noch gebaut. Die jüngsten Einwände des Denkmalamtes sehe man gelassen, sagte Konzernsprecher Sergej Kuprjanov. Und nur weil plötzlich auch der Kulturminister auf den Plan tritt und die Staatsanwaltschaft einschaltet, werde Gazprom-Chef Alexei Miller das Projekt nicht korrigieren". (DIE WELT)

WELT: Die fetten Jahren sind vorbei

"Santo Domingo.- The company of Russian capital Gazprom Transgaz will install a natural gas processing plant in the port of Haina, for freight and domestic use and several modules to generate electricity, at a cost of US$800 million.

In its operational phase the project will generate around 1,000 jobs 6,000 and construction is slated to start within four years, said Foreign Relations minister Carlos Morales and Gazprom general manager George Fokin in a National Palace press conference after meeting with president Leonel Fernandez. Fokin said the project includes construction of a tank to hold 250,000 cubic meters of natural gas and 3 generator modules to produce 300 megawatts of energy". (DOMINICANTODAY)

"Russia’s economic decline eased last quarter from a record slump in the previous three months as oil, gas and metals prices rebounded and stimulus measures helped offset the impact of the global recession. Output of the world’s biggest energy exporter shrank 8.9 percent in the third quarter from a year earlier, after contracting a record 10.9 percent in the previous period, the State Statistics Service said in a preliminary estimate on its Web site today. From the second quarter, output grew a non- seasonally adjusted 13.9 percent. The office didn’t give a breakdown of the figures. “It’s good growth, but it’s caused by the inventory cycle and the recovery of external demand for Russian products, primarily gas and metals,” said Maxim Oreshkin, head of research at OAO Rosbank. “For growth to continue you need end- consumer demand to recover and investment demand to recover. So far there has been no clear recovery in these sectors.”

This year’s 80 percent rebound in the price of Urals crude, Russia’s biggest export, is pushing the former communist superpower to recovery even as President Dmitry Medvedev calls for an end to its “humiliating” reliance on commodities. The economy may grow 3.2 percent in 2010 after slumping 8.7 percent this year, the World Bank said on Nov. 10, marking a bigger turnaround than Russia achieved after its 1998 debt default and devaluation. The ruble was 0.5 percent weaker against the dollar at 28.8030 and little changed against the euro at 42.0051.

Stimulus Pledge

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has pledged 2.5 trillion rubles ($87 billion) in fiscal stimulus to offset the impact of the global recession on the commodity-reliant economy, where energy accounts for 70 percent of export revenue. The central bank has cut the key refinancing rate to a record low 9.5 percent as inflation eased. The Economy Ministry last month said the decline eased to an annual 9.4 percent. According to the ministry, gross domestic product grew a seasonally adjusted 0.6 percent in the third quarter from the previous three months, and gained a seasonally- adjusted 0.5 percent in September from August. Oil prices in excess of government estimates will help narrow this year’s budget deficit to 7.5 percent of GDP from an earlier forecast of 8.3 percent, Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said on Oct. 21, enabling the government to maintain the stimulus. Its 2010 budget deficit outlook assumes crude will average $58 a barrel and rise to $60 in 2012.

Rising Oil Prices

The World Bank on Nov. 10 estimated oil will average $61.4 a barrel this year, rising to $75.3 next year. Higher oil revenue means the government has less need to dip into its $77.2 billion Reserve Fund, which was created to shield the budget from a drop in oil prices. The fund gained in dollar terms last month for the first time since January as the Finance Ministry held off on transferring money to the budget. Rising oil prices have also helped exports recover with sales abroad up 7.6 percent in September from August. From a year earlier, exports are down 33 percent, according to central bank data. “We doubt that Russia’s GDP will resume growth without a continuing rise in exports,” Orlova said in the report. “Until the lack of investment is addressed, we believe there is a high risk that output will remain stagnant.”

Bank Lending

While higher raw material prices have helped commodity exporters and bolstered state finances, companies have lacked funding to invest in continued growth. Rate cuts have so far failed to revive bank lending, hindering companies’ efforts to stay afloat. Lenders’ corporate loan books fell 0.7 percent in September from August after staying unchanged the previous month, the central bank estimates. Lending to consumers dropped 1.1 percent for an eighth consecutive monthly decline and delinquent retail loans climbed to 6.4 percent from 6.2 percent. While the proportion of overdue corporate loans fell to 5.6 percent in September from 5.7 percent the month before, “it’s still too early to relax,” said Gennady Melikyan, a Bank Rossii first deputy chairman, on Nov. 2. The central bank registered no significant increase in lending in October, Alexei Ulyukayev, a first deputy central bank head, said on Nov. 9, according to RIA Novosti. Though oil price gains are helping the economy now, even as banks limit credit, Russia’s failure to diversify threatens its prospects of sustainable growth.

‘Biggest Problem’

“Our biggest problem of course is our excessive dependence on the situation in one market -- the oil market,” Ulyukayev said in an interview. “There are no counterweights. The economy, the financial system has no insurance.” Ulyukayev said this was “connected with the way we finance growth. We are too dependent on importing private capital -- be it for banks, non-financial companies or household income. All this creates a situation where growth can suddenly ‘explode,’ which is what happened.” Medvedev in his state-of-the-nation address today also renewed his demand for an end to the dependence on commodities. “We haven’t freed ourselves from the primitive structure of the economy,” he said. “The habit of living off exports is still hindering our innovative development. It’s a question of our country’s survival in the modern world.” (BLOOMBERG)

Sul discorso alla nazione di Medvedev: Bloomberg, MoscowTimes

"Es war nicht nur ein freundlicher Plausch, wie ihn Faymann am Vortag mit Präsident Dmitrij Medwedjew geführt hat. Putin zog alle Register. Er lachte, er polterte, und phasenweise heizte er dem Bundeskanzler im Moskauer Gästehaus der russischen Regierung richtiggehend ein. Seine rhetorische Offensive und sein massives Drängen hatten ein Ziel: Putin will, dass Österreich bei der Gaspipeline „South Stream“ einsteigt. Der OMV-Knotenpunkt Baumgarten soll in seinen Plänen zur Gas-Drehscheibe für ganz Europa werden. Dabei machte er seinem Gast jedoch klar, dass Russland nicht auf Österreich angewiesen sei. Für South Stream gäbe es auch eine alternative Route, die über Slowenien und Italien führt. Schon kommende Woche ist der slowenische Premier Borut Pahor in dieser Sache in Moskau angesagt. Bei Faymann freilich rannte Putin ohnehin offene Türen ein. Der Bundeskanzler gab deutlich seine Unterstützung für South Stream zu erkennen und führte an, dass die österreichische Regierung bereits am 27. Oktober einen Entschluss darüber gefällt habe, Verhandlungen über eine Beteiligung an South Stream aufzunehmen. Doch Putin war das offenbar nicht eifrig genug, er drückte aufs Tempo. „Raschestmöglich sollen die Gespräche abgeschlossen werden“, sagte er bei einer abschließenden Pressekonferenz. Hinter verschlossenen Türen soll er darauf gedrängt haben, schon bis Ende des Jahres ein Regierungsabkommen zu unterzeichnen. Es müsse Klarheit herrschen, welche Grundstücke Österreich für die Gasleitung zur Verfügung stelle.

Schlüsselrolle der OMV

Der russische Premier sieht Wien offenbar als einen Verbündeten in der Europäischen Union. Österreich sei „in der EU ein Schlüsselpartner für Russland“, erklärte Putin bei der Pressekonferenz. Davor ließ er angeblich durchblicken, dass er das Thema South Stream direkt mit Österreich besprechen wolle – und nicht mit Brüssel. Es ist seit Jahren Russlands Strategie, eine gemeinsame europäische Linie in der Frage der Energiesicherheit zu hintertreiben. Die EU hat es sich zum Ziel gesetzt, ihre Energieabhängigkeit von Russland zu reduzieren. Ein wesentliches Instrument dafür ist die geplante Nabucco-Pipeline, die Gas aus dem kaspischen Raum und später auch aus dem Iran nach Europa bringen soll. Eine Schlüsselrolle in dem Projekt spielt die OMV, die es sich jedoch gleichzeitig mit ihrem russischen Hauptlieferanten nicht verscherzen will. Deshalb nun die Bereitschaft, in South Stream einzusteigen, das Russland als Alternative zu Nabucco aufzieht. Faymann unterstrich mehrmals, die zwei Pipelineprojekte stünden nicht im Gegensatz. Dabei verhehlte er nicht, dass Österreich schon jetzt zu 54 Prozent von russischem Gas „abhängig“ sei.

Putin sprach Tacheles bei seinem Treffen mit Faymann: Ausdrücklich merkte er an, dass South Stream die Möglichkeit biete, unbotmäßige Transitländer wie die Ukraine zu „disziplinieren“. Die neue Gasleitung würde einen großen Bogen um die Ukraine und Osteuropa machen. In Zukunft wäre es also Russland möglich, Moskaus ehemaligen Vasallenstaaten den Gashahn zuzudrehen, ohne damit gleichzeitig die Versorgung Westeuropas zu unterbrechen. Gleichzeitig drohte Putin bei der Pressekonferenz neuerlich mit einem Lieferstopp. Wenn die Ukraine ihre Gasrechnungen nicht bezahle, dürfe sie kein Gas mehr beziehen. Sollte die Ukraine dann aber Gas anzapfen, das für Europa bestimmt sei, müsse Russland die Gasversorgung dann abermals völlig unterbrechen.

Keine AKW: Das freut Putin

Als Faymann während des Delegationsgesprächs erklärte, dass Österreich über keine Atomkraftwerke verfüge, soll Putin angeblich gelacht haben: Das sei eine sehr gute Entscheidung, auch für Russland. An seiner Seite hatte der Ministerpräsident bei seinem Gespräch den mächtigen Chef von Gasprom, Alexej Miller. Faymann hatte niemanden von der OMV nach Moskau mitgebracht.

AUA-Streit ungelöst

Weitere Themen: Die Druschba-Ölpipeline soll von Bratislava nach Schwechat verlängert werden. Und auch über eine Verlängerung der russischen Breitspureisenbahn nach Schwechat wurde gesprochen. So soll es möglich werden, Güter künftig auf der Schiene von China bis Europa zu transportieren.
Keine Einigung ist beim Streit um die Landerechte der AUA in Sicht. Putin beharrte darauf, dass die Verträge nach dem Einstieg der Lufthansa bei der AUA neu verhandelt werden müssten. Die Bedingungen hätten sich geändert. Er schuf jedoch eine neue zeitliche Frist für die Verhandlungen. Die alten Abkommen sollen bis Februar verlängert werden. Faymann verbuchte das als Erfolg. Er lud seinen Gastgeber zudem ein, von 19. bis 21. März zum Europaforum nach Lech zu kommen. Putin sagte prinzipiell zu, wollte sich aber nicht festlegen. Das Gespräch mit Faymann führte der russische Premier übrigens weitgehend auf Deutsch, besonders, wenn es um sein wichtigstes Anliegen ging: South Stream". (DIEPRESSE)

"Italian energy giant Eni SpA is facing a threat to its lucrative natural-gas business, long considered a ballast against volatile oil prices, as European Union trade regulators consider breaking up its network. The company is due to testify before EU regulators on Nov. 27 to respond to allegations made by Brussels that it has restricted rivals from gaining access to its extensive natural-gas pipelines, according to a spokeswoman for EU antitrust Commissioner Neelie Kroes.

The hearing, requested by Eni, is the final step before the European Commission concludes a long-running inquiry into whether Eni has abused its dominant position in Europe's natural-gas market. Brussels is expected to rule on the issue next year. Eni runs a sprawling pipeline network that delivers natural gas from the Continent's biggest suppliers—Russia, Algeria, Norway—into the heart of Europe, from Belgium to the tip of the Italian peninsula. The business generates more than a third of Eni's revenues. Eni risks losing control of vital pipelines that have functioned as the main arteries of its gas business for decades. Brussels alleges that Eni refused to sell capacity in its pipelines to rival companies seeking a route to deliver Russian and Dutch gas to European nations. Brussels has also accused Eni of "strategic underinvestment" that restricted the amount of natural gas flowing through the pipelines. Eni said it is cooperating with the inquiry but declined to comment on the charges or the coming hearing. If Brussels rules against Eni, the company could face a fine in the billions of euros, or up to 10% of its total annual revenues, which were €108 billion ($159 billion) in 2008. Regulators could also force Eni to sell part of its pipeline network. The inquiry cuts to the heart of long-running battles between Brussels and individual European governments for control of Europe's natural gas market. For decades, European governments have relied on national champions to jockey for access to major natural gas fields, securing the flow of gas to their national markets from far-flung sources.

In recent years, however, the EU has tried to convince governments to agree to new rules that would force companies to separate their production business from their transit and sales businesses. Such separation, Brussels says, would open national markets to competition by companies across the Continent and lower prices for consumers. The EU inquiry is just one of the factors weighing on Eni's natural gas business. A slump in demand for gas in Europe has driven down prices, sapping plans for new pipelines. Last week Russian gas monopoly OAO Gazprom's $11 billion Nord Stream pipeline project cleared its last major regulatory hurdles when it won approval from Finland and Sweden to carry gas across their borders to the rest of Europe, a move that could boost supply and keep gas prices down in the years to come. Eni is currently on the hunt for another partner to join its own venture with Gazprom, to build the South Stream pipeline. The ambitious project calls for a new pipeline to carry gas under the Black Sea to central Europe and Italy, bypassing Ukraine, whose rocky relationship with Moscow has led to cutoffs in the flow of gas to Europe in recent year. Meanwhile, Knight Vinke, an activist investment fund that holds 1% of Eni, wants Eni's gas utility business separated from the rest of the company, arguing that it no longer makes financial sense to keep Eni's upstream and downstream operations yoked together.

Eni has long been one of the oil industry's more daring players, cutting deals with controversial regimes and drilling in some of the world's most far-flung and challenging environments. The high-risk nature of Eni's pursuit of new supplies of crude has been offset by the relative stability of the company's natural gas business. Unlike other oil majors, Eni owns some of Europe's biggest natural gas pipelines and controls a vast distribution and retailing network, allowing the company to not only pump fossil fuel from distant oil and gas fields but also distribute it across Europe and even deliver it directly to homes in Italy. The hybrid business also has acted like an insurance policy against swings in the prices of oil and natural gas, because most of Eni's natural gas contracts are set for years in advance. The unique structure has allowed the company to punch above its weight in an industry dominated by scale: Countries such as Russia are willing to look beyond Eni's smaller size because it offers potential deals in other parts of the market. In recent years, for example, Eni has agreed to give up a slice of its Italian gas market to Gazprom in order to secure supply contracts to 2035 and in exchange for access to Russia's vast energy reserves. Eni's natural gas business has high margins because it doesn't have to pay third parties to transport the gas it purchases in Russia and Algeria. Eni also markets the gas at steady prices in Italy's highly regulated gas market. "The synergies are too strong to risk destroying," saidIrene Himona, an analyst with Exane BNP Paribas.

The EU case began in May 2006 with a series of dawn raids on Eni offices, and the company was formally placed under investigation the following year. Since then, Eni Chief Executive Paolo Scaroni has repeatedly said that Eni aims to reach a compromise with Brussels and avoid a potential fine or the forced sale of assets. Mr. Scaroni declined to be interviewed for this article. As the inquiry nears a ruling, however, Eni's window to negotiate a compromise and avoid a fine is narrowing, analysts said. "Given all the work done and the administrative resources deployed, [the Commission] might want to pursue the case to the end and adopt a negative decision," said Filippo Amato, a lawyer at Jones Day specializing in EU competition. In a statement reporting its third-quarter results, the company didn't specifically mention the commission's inquiry, but said Eni "believes that losses from those proceedings are either not probable or not reasonably quantifiable." European energy companies have traditionally sought to avoid fines by settling antitrust cases before EU inquiries reach their final stages. In 2008, German energy company E.On AG agreed to give up part of its electricity grid and German utility RWE AG sold off part of its natural-gas network. Eni is in a tougher spot. The company's controlling shareholder, the Italian government, says Italy's energy security hinges on Eni maintaining control of major gas conduits such as the TAG pipeline, which cuts a path from Russia through central Europe to supply most of Italy's natural gas. "There are requirements that are more important than the rules," Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said in March after the EU formalized its probe in against Eni". (WSJ)

"Un gasdotto che cambia la carta geopolitica dell'Europa: questo è il progetto North Stream, una pipeline lunga 1223 km che andrà dalla Russia alla Germania, passando nel Mar Baltico e scavalcando i Paesi dell'Europa dell'Est. Dopo l'approvazione della Danimarca, il mese scorso, il progetto due giorni fa ha ricevuto l'ultimo via libera dai governi svedese e finlandese, che hanno concesso alla società che realizzerà il gasdotto di utilizzare le loro Zone Economiche Esclusive, nel Mar Baltico, rispettivamente per 506 e 374 km. Il consorzio che realizzerà North Stream è guidato dal colosso energetico russo Gazprom, ma vi partecipano anche le tedesche E.On Rurgas e Basf-Wintershall, e prevede di iniziare i lavori entro la primavera 2010: l'opera - che permetterebbe la distribuzione del gas russo anche ad altri Paesi europei - dovrebbe essere completata entro il 2011. Ma, come spiegava ieri un reportage del quotidiano 'El Paìs', Polonia, Ucraina e Bielorussia vedono questa infrastruttura come una perdita di 'garanzie' rispetto al vicino russo che potrebbe interrompere l'erogazione del gas in caso di divergenze di natura economica o politica.

"Costruire un gasdotto in fondo al mare - osservava un esperto polacco citato dal quotidiano spagnolo - ha dei costi quattro o cinque volte superiori che realizzarlo via terra": la differenza, secondo alcune stime, è fra i 12 miliardi di euro del North Stream e i 3 miliardi dell'Amber Pipeline, l'opzione terrestre sostenuta da Varsavia. Ma, nel lungo termine, è la risposta del consorzio russo-tedesco, i costi di gestione più bassi e il mancato pagamento dei diritti di transito rendono North Stream più conveniente rispetto all'opzione via terra.

Ad esprimere all'Adnkronos le perplessità della Polonia è Piotr Paszkowski, portavoce del ministero degli Esteri. Il governo di Varsavia "non vuole commentare certe ricostruzioni" su possibili pressioni di Mosca, dice Paszkowski, ma di sicuro continua "a chiedersi perché sia stato scelto di andare avanti con un progetto, come quello del North Stream, che è più complicato e meno conveniente del raddoppio del gasdotto esistente".

Paszkowski è prudente sulle implicazioni politiche dell'impresa tuttavia sottolinea come "le attuali infrastrutture sono state già progettate e costruite per un raddoppio della pipeline, un'operazione più agevole e conveniente" della realizzazione di un gasdotto nelle acque del Baltico.

Per Lamberto Dini, presidente della commissione Esteri del Senato, interpellato dall'Adnkronos, le decisioni per la costruzione dei gasdotti North Stream e South Stream ormai sono state prese e non presentano controindicazioni. Dini respinge le obiezioni di coloro che temono che queste scelte relative all'approvvigionamento di gas da parte dell'Europa possano avere ripercussioni sugli equilibri geopolitici, in particolare creando nuove barriere con i Paesi dell'Est.

"North Stream - sottolinea - è stato voluto dall'ex cancelliere tedesco Gerhard Schroeder e riguarda i rapporti tra Germania e Russia e quindi non è una questione che tocca l'Italia. Noi siamo interessati a South Stream, dove interviene l'Eni con tutte le principali compagnie petrolifere europee". "Si tratta - aggiunge il presidente della commissione Esteri del Senato - di scelte che sono state compiute per non esporre l'Europa al ricatto dei Paesi di transito ed è chiaro che entrano in gioco interessi commerciali e politici".

In riferimento ai Paesi dell'Est, 'scavalcati' dalla pipeline, Dini osserva che "è normale che arrivi una forte opposizione da parte di quelle nazioni che perdono forza politica ed economica dato che il gas non passa più sul loro territorio". "E' altrettanto naturale - aggiunge - che ci sia chi sottolinea che il legame che si stabilisce con la Russia può dare fastidio agli Stati Uniti. Ma si tratta di obiezioni non condivisibili e di argomenti che, a mio avviso, non rappresentano delle controindicazioni rispetto alle scelte fatte". "Qual è infatti per l'Italia l'alternativa al gas russo oltre a quello che arriva da Algeria e Libia? Proprio ieri - conclude Dini - ho partecipato a un convegno con l'ex premier della Russia Evgeni Primakov e in quella sede è stato sottolineato, tra l'altro, che la Russia possiede il 40% delle materie prime".

Secondo il viceministro Adolfo Urso, l'Europa dovrebbe avere ''una politica energetica comune'' evitando divisioni tra i diversi stati. ''E' emblematico - sottolinea Urso all'Adnkronos - che sul piano energetico c'è una parte dell'Europa favorevole" al nuovo corridoio energetico South Stream "e un'altra antagonista".

Per Urso al centro della divisione i rapporti con la Russia. "La realtà - sottolinea - è che l'Europa rischia ancora una volta di dividersi tra chi guarda alla Russia e chi la osteggia. Oggi la questione è ancor più seria perché l'Europa ha istituzioni comuni e dovrebbe avere una politica estera e di difesa comune. E soprattutto una politica energetica comune che, ove ci fosse, sarebbe meglio esprimere direttamente con un unico Mister Energia". Perché, sottolinea il viceministro "finché Italia e Germania saranno da una parte, Gran Bretagna e Francia dall'altra, il nostro continente resterà solo un cliente e non un partner".

Sulla questione interviene anche Luigi De Paoli, professore di Economia dell'Università Bocconi, per il quale North Stream come strumento di pressione politica della Russia sull'Europa orientale è uno scenario possibile, ma che potrebbe avverarsi anche grazie al consenso dell'Europa occidentale fortemente interessata a quel gasdotto e a quelli di South Stream e Nabucco.

''E' vero - sottolinea De Paoli all'Adnkronos - questo potrebbe accadere". Ma quello che Mosca sta portando avanti avviene "con il nostro pieno consenso e il nostro aiuto'' sottolinea l'economista. Questi gasdotti, aggiunge De Paoli, ''non vengono fatti dai russi e basta", ma con la collaborazione di "tutti i Paesi occidentali''. Con North Stream, la Russia ''intende 'bypassare' i Paesi intermedi, dell'ex Unione Sovietica, in particolare Ucraina e Bielorussia ma è per la stessa ragione che i Paesi occidentali e in particolare la Germania sono fortemente interessati a questo gasdotto. Non a caso l'ex cancelliere tedesco, Gerhard Schroeder, è il presidente del comitato degli azionisti di North Stream''.

Infatti, sottolinea De Paoli, ''è interesse dei russi ma anche dei Paesi dell'Europa occidentale che il gasdotto non sia sottoposto al controllo dei Paesi intermedi. Passando sotto il Mar Baltico non c'è la possibilità di prelevare gas o chiudere i rubinetti''. Chiaramente, questo, ''potrebbe avere ripercussioni su alcuni Paesi dell'Europa orientale, come l'Ucraina che perderebbe il suo ruolo di controllore e il suo potere negoziale che gli permette di acquistare il gas russo a un prezzo inferiore a quello di mercato". (ADNKRONOS)

"Kaum zehn Monate ist es her, als der russische Premier Wladimir Putin und seine ukrainische Amtskollegin Julia Tymoschenko nach einem nächtlichen Verhandlungsmarathon in Moskau den Beginn einer neuen Ära verkündeten. Der gerade beschlossene langfristige Vertrag würde eine stabile Gaslieferung garantieren, hieß es damals. Vorbei die Zeit, dass der Streit zwischen Moskau und Kiew regelmäßig zum Jahreswechsel einen Lieferstopp und kalte Wohnungen in der Ukraine und in Europa nach sich zog. Den Jahreswechsel 2010 werde sie mit ihren Lieben zu Hause und nicht am Verhandlungstisch verbringen, versprach Tymoschenko damals. Doch nun mehren sich die Anzeichen dafür, dass mit dem Winter die instabilen Verhältnisse zurückkehren. Putin warnte die Europäische Union (EU) Anfang der Woche, wegen der Zahlungsunfähigkeit des ukrainischen Gasmonopolisten Naftogaz könne es erneut zu Lieferengpässen kommen. "Europa soll doch ein Milliärdchen locker machen", meinte der Regierungschef flapsig. Am Mittwochabend teilte Naftogaz mit, die "schwierige Finanzsituation in der Ukraine" und die "wachsenden Schulden der Verbraucher" erschwerten die "vollständige und pünktliche" Zahlung für das im Oktober gelieferte Gas.

Wenige Stunden zuvor hatte bereits der ukrainische Vizepremier Grigoriy Nemyria in Brüssel vorgesprochen und die EU zu einer kurzfristigen Finanzhilfe aufgefordert. "Das Gasproblem ist ein europäisches", sagte Nemyria im Gespräch mit der WELT. Das sieht die EU-Kommission allerdings ganz anders, die Beamten im Brüsseler Berlaymont-Gebäude sind schlecht auf Kiew zu sprechen. Nach dem Gaskrieg am Jahresbeginn hatten sie versucht, einer Wiederholung des Desasters vorzubeugen. Zunächst sagte die EU Kiew im März zu, das marode Gasnetz für 2,5 Mrd. Euro zu modernisieren. Als im Juli dann der Hilferuf von Tymoschenko kam, Europa müsse bei den Gazprom-Zahlungen helfen, taten sich die internationalen Finanzorganisationen zusammen: Knapp 1,2 Mrd. Euro versprachen sie Kiew - aber nur im Gegenzug für Reformen des Gasmarkts. Die ist Tymoschenko bisher aber schuldig geblieben. Bereits für die erste Zusage, die Gaspreise Anfang September um 20 Prozent anzuheben, fand Kiew eine Ausflucht: Man ließ die Gewerkschaften gegen die Maßnahme klagen. "Vor den Wahlen im Januar wird es keine Erhöhung der Preise geben", prophezeit der ukrainische Wirtschaftsexperte Igor Burakowsky. Mitte Januar bewirbt sich Regierungschefin Tymoschenko um das Präsidentenamt. Schärfster Widersacher ist ihr ehemaliger Partner in der Orangenen Revolution, der amtierende Staatschef Wiktor Juschtschenko. Er steht mit dem Rücken zur Wand und wird bisherigen Prognosen zufolge nach dem 17. Januar von der Bildfläche verschwinden. Daher wird das Gas zum Top-Wahlkampfthema.

Brüssel aber will nicht erneut zwischen die Fronten geraten. Kommissionschef José Manuel Barroso gab Juschtschenko in einem Telefonat unzweideutig zu verstehen, dass der Staatschef - der Zahlungen der Nationalbank blockieren kann - den Verpflichtungen von Naftogaz an Gazprom nicht im Weg stehen dürfe. Laut Bogdan Sokolowski, Juschtschenkos Energieberater, sind am morgigen Samstag 460 Mio. Dollar zu begleichen. Da Naftogaz nur etwa 140 Mio. Dollar verdient habe, werde sich die Ukraine das Geld leihen müssen. "Der Hilferuf ist reine Erpressung", meint ein Beobachter in Kiew. Am Ende sei immer Geld für Lieferungen von Gazprom da. Finanzielle Engpässe bei Naftogaz sind nicht neu: Woher sie kommen, ist nur zum Teil einsichtig. Kaum ein Konzern ist so intransparent; und wird so sehr missbraucht für die Interessen unterschiedlicher Politiker. Die verfeindete Staatsführung, die um Einfluss ringt und eine Erhöhung der Inlandspreise aufschiebt, bringt Naftogaz um wichtige Einnahmen und erhöht so den Schuldenberg. Die inländischen Kunden sind trotz Niedrigpreisen mit etwa drei Mrd. Euro im Zahlungsrückstand. Die Ukraine ist nicht nur einer der größten Kunden Gazproms, sie ist gleichzeitig auch das wichtigste Transitland für den Export russischen Gases auf den lukrativen westeuropäischen Markt. Europa, das seinen Bedarf zu einem Viertel mit russischem Gas deckt, bezieht dieses zu 80 Prozent über den ukrainischen Transit. Der Rest fließt über Weißrussland.

Jährlich pumpt die Ukraine bis zum Winter ausreichend Gas in seine unterirdischen Speicher, um im Falle einer Kältewelle keine Engpässe bei sich zu Hause und in Europa aufkommen zu lassen. Laut Naftogaz-Chef Oleg Dubina lagern derzeit über 26 Mrd. Kubikmeter ein. Das ist ein Viertel des deutschen Jahresverbrauchs und ausreichend viel, um eine lückenlose Versorgung zu stützen. Russland hat kein Interesse, dass die Leitungen erneut leer bleiben, Gazprom braucht Geld. Der mit einer Verzögerung von drei bis sechs Monaten an den Ölpreis gebundene Gaspreis schlägt im Moment voll durch. Im dritten Quartal lag der Konzerngewinn um das 7,3-fache unter dem Vorjahreswert. Im Inland verdient Gazprom wegen der niedrigen Preise genauso wenig wie Naftogaz. Entscheidend für den Konzern ist daher der europäische Markt. Dort verkauften die Russen ein Drittel ihres geförderten Gases und verdienen damit zwei Drittel ihres Geldes. Im Vorjahr nahmen sie dort 65 Mrd. Dollar ein. Für 2009 liegen die Prognosen bei bescheidenen 40 Mrd. Dollar. Auch deswegen instrumentalisiere Putin einen möglichen Gaskonflikt, erklärt Michail Kortschemkin, Direktor von East European Gas Analysis: Mit den Drohungen wolle er Europa von der Notwendigkeit überzeugen, die beiden Pipelines "South Stream" und "Nord Stream" als Umgehung der Ukraine zu bauen". (DIEWELT)

"Russia's Deputy Prime Minister and energy tsar, Igor Sechin, is attempting to divide the Black Sea with a stroke almost as dramatic as the biblical one with which Moses surprised the Pharaoh at the Red Sea. If you believe the latter, the former may be credible, despite the refusal of Russian energy policymakers to clarify what they are doing and what they think the commercial logic of the move to be. For tanker operators, the move threatens to cancel the long-planned crude oil pipeline running from Burgas, on Bulgaria's Black Sea coast, to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandropouli. Instead, Sechin now appears to favor expansion of port capacity at Ceyhan, the Turkish eastern Mediterranean tanker terminal, which will be supplied for the first time with Russian crude. This is to be piped from a new terminal to be built at Samsun, on Turkey's Black Sea coast So, instead of a tanker shuttle moving westward from Novorossiysk across the Black Sea to the Bulgarian resort city of Burgas, which has been the plan agreed with Bulgaria and Greece until now, Sechin's plan calls for a new southward tanker route to Samsun. Swept away also are plans for Bulgaria to become a hub for storage and shipment of Russian natural gas, along two arms of the proposed South Stream pipeline.

On October 19, at a meeting in Milan with Turkey's Minister of Economics, Taner Yildiz, Sechin announced the new Russian direction for South Stream through Turkish territorial waters. In addition, it was announced that he had agreed to supply Russian crude oil to a new pipeline across Turkey from Samsun to Ceyhan, which the Russian companies, Transneft and Stroytransgas, will help to build.  According to a Russian reporter granted special access to Sechin, the new scheme has been in negotiation with the Turks since Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was in Ankara on August 6. Ahead of Sechin's arrival to meet Yildiz in Milan, Russian officials are reported to have been working out the new scheme, which, in the newspaper report at least, diverts the seabed route of South Stream under the Black Sea by up to 230 kilometers southward to Turkish territorial waters; replaces Bulgaria as Russia's energy transit partner for both oil and gas; and agrees to the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline as a substitute for the Burgas-Alexandroupoli route. Most industry analysts in Moscow believe that the Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline was the condition the Turks imposed in order to give the Russians the go-ahead to lay South Stream on the Turkish sector of the seabed. However, there is no evidence that this is what happened.

Sources in Moscow agree that the routing of the new gas pipeline must skirt the 12-nautical mile (22.2 kilometer) territorial limit of Ukraine to avoid more political trouble with Kiev. However, at the narrowest point between the Ukrainian coastline at the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea coast of Turkey, around Inebolou, the sea is 280km wide. Subtracting 12nm (22.2km) for the Ukrainian and Turkish territorial zones leaves a stretch of international water of about 235km. The seabed depth in this area is between 600 meters and 1,200 meters. This is less than the 1,200m to 2,250m depths which Gazprom's Blue Stream gas pipeline already crosses on the Black Sea seabed between Arkhipo-Osipovka and Durusu. According to Gazprom and the sub-sea pipeline builder Saipem, parts of this route, which started delivering Russian gas to Turkey in 2005, are among the deepest ever used for pipelines. Sources concede therefore that there is no technical reason why the proposed South Stream must be diverted so far south, out of the international zone, and at a greater distance and project cost. Current estimates for South Stream put the price tag of the entire project at about US$13 billion.

Gazprom, Russia's leading company, has told Asia Times Online that the reports of Sechin's agreement with the Turkish government to reroute the South Stream gas pipeline onto Turkish territory do not mean that Gazprom has decided to lay a land segment of the pipeline in Turkey, and bypass Bulgaria altogether. But Gazprom is unwilling to rule that option out, or to say what it understands by the Sechin plan. The company's principal spokesman, Sergei Kupriyanov, is not answering questions, adding to the impression that his company's leadership is in disarray over Sechin's moves towards Turkey. Another Gazprom source told Asia Times Online that Russia had asked Turkey for permission, and received it, to explore the territorial waters of Turkey to find out whether the area was suitable for the pipeline. "If it is suitable, then the pipeline may be laid across Turkish marine territory," the Gazprom source said. "Where it goes next - to Turkey or to Bulgaria or elsewhere - is not decided yet."  The doubt in that last line is challenged by the Bulgarians, who claim they have already signed commitments with Putin to lay South Stream across Bulgarian land territory.

Since 2007, Gazprom's map showing its proposed route for South Stream begins in Dzhubga, near Tuapse port, on the Russian Black Sea coast, and ends at Varna, on the Bulgarian coast. The route passes through international waters well south of the Ukrainian zone, and equally clear of Turkish territorial waters. [1]  Hours after Sechin announced his Black Sea move, embracing his Turkish counterpart Yildiz in the process, Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller was in Belgrade, Serbia, along with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, to agree on funding and building the Serbian section of the South Stream project's northern branch; and also to establish a major gas storage in Serbia. The regular news wires reported that Turkey's President Abdullah Gul had telephoned Medvedev there, to inform him of the decision to allow the Russians to survey the Turkish sector of the Black Sea. "The Turkish president said that the Turkish government had taken all the necessary decisions to give permission for geological and explorative work in Turkey's economic zone of the Black Sea for the South Sea gas pipeline," Reuters quoted a Kremlin statement as explaining. Note that the "economic zone" referred to in this report may not be the same stretch of seabed as Turkish territorial waters. Turkish Embassy sources in Moscow won't say which Gul's telephone call meant. The hint from Sechin that he and the Turks will move South Stream away from Bulgaria altogether has produced angry reaction in Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, where the government denies it is losing to Turkey both the gas pipeline and the Burgas-Alexandroupoli crude oil pipeline, which Moscow has been backing for more than a decade - until now.

On October 22, Gazprom announced that Miller had met with Paolo Scaroni, chief executive of Italian gas company Eni, Gazprom's partner in South Stream. But their communique had almost nothing to say about the routing options for the South Stream pipeline. "The plan of further actions connected with building the marine part of the gas pipeline has been considered," Gazprom said of the meeting. Eni spokesman, Filippo Catalini, told Asia Times Online the agreement between Turkey and Russia to allow the route of South Stream to pass through the Turkish EEZ was signed on August 6, 2009, in Ankara. Eni is evidently not endorsing a change of route for South Stream. Neither is the Bulgarian government. Bulgarian Energy Minister Traycho Traykov flew to Moscow on October 22, where he met his counterpart, Russian Energy Minister Sergey Shmatko. Bulgarian government officials told Asia Times Online they already had a signed agreement with the Russians for the South Stream pipeline to enter Bulgarian territorial waters and come ashore at Varna. How the pipeline is routed through the Black Sea before that has not been decided, they noted, adding that it made no technical or economic sense to reroute the pipeline south into Turkish territorial waters. The Bulgarians also expressed concern with the future of the Burgas-Alexandroupoli oil pipeline, as they conceded there was no commercial future for that, if the Russians decided on Samsun-Ceyhan.Following his meeting with Traykov, Shmatko announced publicly he now thought of the Turkish pipeline option as "a new rising star ... we want to build a major refinery and jointly sell oil products from the Mediterranean coast".

Professor Alexander Kovalev is an expert on the law of the sea and on Russian maritime law at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He told Asia Times Online that an international maritime convention of 1982 requires a country laying a pipeline on the continental shelf of another country to coordinate the route between them. But he noted that in Russia there is no constitutional requirement for the Russian government to notify parliament, or apply for its ratification, if agreements are signed on seabed issues, including the Black Sea EEZ borders, or route changes of South Stream. Deputy Prime Minister Sechin's office did not respond to questions, and he has never addressed parliament to explain what he is doing. Adding to the confusion which Sechin has set in motion, LUKoil, Russia's second-largest oil producer and exporter, says it has no interest in supplying crude oil for the proposed Samsun to Ceyhan pipeline. Until now, the Kremlin has refused to countenance proposals for Russian crude to be delivered across Turkey, either for refining in country, or for export at Ceyhan, which is the tanker terminal on the eastern Mediterranean for a US-backed crude oil pipeline currently delivering Azeri oil from Caspian fields. A Rosneft spokesman told Asia Times Online that it was joining the Sechin oil pipeline proposal, along with the Russian pipeline company Transneft, Eni of Italy (which had originated the project in 2005, when there was no Russian crude to fill it), and the Calik Holding of Turkey.

Sechin, who is also chairman of the board at Rosneft, the state-owned lead producer in Russia, claimed in the October 19 announcement that LUKoil was interested in the proposed 555km pipeline to Ceyhan, which will have a 1.5 million barrels per day capacity. LUKoil's statement to Asia Times Online is a categorical denial. Rosneft is equally categorical that it wants to participate. In 2007, LUKoil tried but failed to get Turkish and Russian government agreement for a new refinery at Zonguldak, on Turkey's Black Sea coast, 400km to the west of Samsun. Asked if a dramatic change was underway in Russia's oil and gas pipeline strategy, Moscow maritime analyst Alexei Bezborodov said the situation over oil transportation in the Black Sea had now become too complicated to understand or to express an opinion about. Most Gazprom analysts at Moscow's investment banks agree that the Black Sea's waters are now too murky for them to predict what will happen next". (ASIATIMES)

"La caduta del muro di Berlino vent’anni fa è stato il segnale più dirompente della crisi sovietica in fase avanzata. Si temeva nella notte del 9 novembre l’arrivo devastante di divisioni corazzate sovietiche, come già successo nel 1953 nella stessa città e nel 1968 a Praga. Non successe, e il mondo cambiò per sempre.

Sulle ragioni della crisi sovietica si è scritto molto e la tesi più accreditata è quella dell’ “iperspesa” sovietica. Il sistema statale inefficiente, reso isterico dalla competizione militare reaganiana, giunse in pochi anni a una crisi che generò prima il disarmo, e poi la disgregazione.

Esiste però un altro aspetto meno noto della crisi, dovuto al calo delle entrate pubbliche, fortemente dipendenti dall’esportazione di gas e petrolio. La Cia ha calcolato che nel 1985 il 35% delle entrate in valuta pesante di Mosca dipendevano dagli idrocarburi. Queste enormi entrate erano generate per solo un terzo dell’esportazione, destinata ai Paesi occidentali, i restanti due terzi erano assegnati ai Paesi socialisti del Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

Nel maggio del 1986, il prezzo del barile scese sotto i 10 dollari. Ciò generò un duplice effetto: da una parte le entrate in valuta pesante si abbassarono; dall’altra, i Paesi socialisti, legati a contratti di fornitura di lungo periodo, finirono per pagare il petrolio più della compagine occidentale, acuendo i problemi di stagnazione condivisi dalle maggiori economie di comando.

Mosca tentò di reagire: a partire dal 1986, i fondi destinati agli investimenti energetici aumentarono, raggiungendo in due anni il 24,3 % del totale degli investimenti sovietici. Ciò non bastò: le attrezzature sovietiche erano almeno vent’anni indietro rispetto a quelle americane. L’esplorazione portava sempre meno risultati.

Già nel 1983 la Cia rilevava che l’Urss stava iniziando a dirottare il petrolio dai consumatori allineati dell’Est Europa all’Occidente, pur di far cassa; e per alcuni mesi era riuscita a tenere in equilibrio il bilancio statale. Dagli inaffidabili bilanci statali iniziò a trasparire che Mosca stava però incorrendo in qualche problema: tra il 1985 e il 1987 i prestiti delle banche europee al Cremlino salirono da 11 a 26 miliardi di dollari. Il deficit nel 1989 esplose a 160 miliardi.

Il punto chiave della storia è che la crisi petrolifera sovietica è stata in parte indotta da una deliberata strategia americana. Nel 1977 la Cia rilevò che il settore petrolifero sovietico era sull’orlo della crisi (The Impending Soviet Oil Crisis, Er 77-10147); sarebbe stato salvato dalla risalita dei prezzi del 1979. Il neoliberale Regan aprì il settore petrolifero per motivi squisitamente domestici (favorire i consumi nazionali), ma con la consapevolezza che ciò avrebbe danneggiato le casse sovietiche.

Non è un caso che nel 1985 il direttore della Cia Bill Casey venne inviato in Arabia Saudita a parlare col suo omologo, il principe Turki. Il messaggio? Se volete mandar via i russi dall’Afghanistan, producete più petrolio. Gli arabi presero tempo. Poi si accorsero che, in realtà, già i consumi petroliferi erano in caduta (a causa dell’efficientamento economico post-1979); inoltre la produzione non-Opec era cresciuta di 10 milioni di barili al giorno tra il 1981 e il 1986, grazie anche alle aperture americane. L’Arabia Saudita produceva 2 milioni di barili di petrolio al giorno nell’agosto del 1985; in sei mesi passarono a cinque milioni di barili al giorno. I sauditi mantennero costanti i loro introiti aumentando le quantità, con il barile scivolato sotto i dieci dollari; ma riuscirono a ottenere l’obiettivo della ritirata sovietica. Mosca lasciò in realtà tutto il quadrante mediorientale. Non fu un caso". (LIMES)